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A FULL SPECTRUM OF LIGHT: RETHINKING THE
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION
TODD IZZOt
A philosopher-economist might observe that the opportunity cost of virtue
falls as one moves up the income scale.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the federal government provided a $17 billion subsidy
to the nation's charitable organizations 2 by allowing individuals3
a deduction 4 for contributions to qualified charitable organiza-
tions5 in the calculation of taxable income. The funding of
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'I RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 362 (3d ed. 1980).
2 See STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAx EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1993-97, at 21 (Comm. Print 1992)
[hereinafter ESTIMATES]. The amount for 1993 is estimated at $17.8 billion. See id.
at 15-16.
3 Although corporations are permitted a similar deduction, this Comment will
discuss only the deduction for individuals. See I.R.C. § 170 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
(stating that corporations may make deductions for charitable contributions). The
total amount of the tax expenditure for the charitable contributions of corporations
is quite small in comparison to that for individuals. See ESTIMATES, supra note 2, at
15-16 (estimating that corporate donations will account for only 8%, or $1.5 billion,
of the total $19.3 billion tax expenditure for charitable contribution deductions in
1993). It also does not appear that the issues presented in this Comment arise in the
context of corporate charitable contributions.
4 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution .... ."). A deduction is a reduction in "gross income in arriving at net
income for tax purposes." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 413 (6th ed. 1990).
' Charitable organizations must satisfy the requirements of § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). Such organizations must be
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster ... amateur sports
competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.., and [must]
not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign .... " Id. The IRS
publishes a two-volume list of all organizations that qualify for the deduction. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS (1992). Over 200,000
organizations are listed rangingfrom the AAA Scholarship Fund of the Lehigh Valley
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charitable organizations through the allowance of a deduction is an
example of a tax expenditure. 6 Permitting a deduction against
taxable income operates as a subsidy to charitable organizations by
reducing the taxes of individuals who contribute to those organiza-
tions.
For example, if a taxpayer at the 15% marginal tax rate7 is
entitled to deduct the $100 that she donated to a qualified charity,
then the deduction reduces her taxable income by $100 and her tax
liability by $15,8 lowering the net opportunity cost of her charitable
contribution to $85. Assuming the taxpayer was prepared originally
to make a donation of $100 without a tax subsidy, the presence of
the tax subsidy will induce her to increase her donation to $118,
because a donation of that amount will reduce her tax liability by
$18, 9 returning the net cost of her donation to $100.10 Empirical
research bears out the assumption that the existence of a deduction
will induce taxpayers, on average, to increase their contributions
Motor Club to the Zuni Canyon Institute and representing viewpoints as potentially
adverse as the Right to Life Education Committee and the Pro-Choice Education
Society. See 1 id. at 1; 2 id. at 449, 502, 956.
6 "'Tax Expenditures' are defined... as reductions in individual and corporate
income tax liabilities that result from special tax provisions .... These special tax
provisions can take the form of exclusions, credits, deductions, preferential tax rates,
or deferrals of tax liability." ESTIMATES, supra note 2, at 2. Whatever their form, tax
expenditures "are considered to be analogous to direct outlay programs, and the two
can be viewed as alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives
.... They are a measure of the economic benefits that are provided through the tax
laws to various.., sectors of the economy." Id. Reducing tax revenue by allowing
a deduction from taxable income is an alternative to collecting the money in tax
revenue and then spending it on the sector of the economy benefitted by the
deduction. In the case of charitable contribution deductions, charitable organizations
are the benefactors.
7 A taxpayer's marginal tax rate is the "tax rate on the last dollar of taxable
income." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1462. For example, if a taxpayer faces a
marginal tax rate of 20%, her next dollar of income increases her taxes by 20 cents.
Contrast a taxpayer's average rate-the percentage of tax paid with respect to income
as a whole. For instance, if a taxpayer has income of $20,000 and pays taxes of
$4,000, her average rate is 20% ($4,000 divided by $20,000 equals 20%).
' The following example is illustrative. If the taxpayer has taxable income of
$20,000 and faces a marginal (and average) tax rate of 15%, her resulting total tax
liability is $3000 ($20,000 multiplied by 15% equals $3000). If she donates $100 to
charity and is entitled to a deduction, her taxable income reduces to $19,900 and her
corresponding tax liability to $2985 ($19,900 multiplied by 15% equals $2985). The
$15 decrease in her tax liability from $3000 to $2985 is equal to the amount of the
deduction, $100, times the marginal tax rate of 15%.
9 The $118 deductible donation multiplied by her 15% tax rate is approximately
equivalent to an $18 tax savings.
10 The $100 net cost of her donation is computed by subtracting the $18 tax
savings from her $118 donation.
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rather than simply pocketing the tax savings.11 Thus, the federal
government has in effect donated money to the charitable organiza-
tion through its allowance of a deduction, inducing an increase in
the charitable organization's receipts from $100 to $118.
Perhaps more importantly is the mechanism by which this
subsidy to charitable organizations is provided. Generally, Congress
allocates government money among competing interests; here, the
individual taxpayer chooses how to allocate public money ($18 in
the preceding example) by deciding which charitable organization
she wishes to support. This power, however, is not extended to all
taxpayers. Under the current Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"),
only taxpayers who itemize deductions are entitled to deduct
charitable contributions from their taxable income. 12 Since high-
income taxpayers are most likely to be itemizers, 13 they have the
greatest voice in selecting which charitable organizations receive
government subsidies through the current tax deduction mecha-
nism. In addition, charitable organizations receiving -donations
from high-income taxpayers enjoy a larger subsidy than that
provided by low-income taxpayers because the marginal tax rate for
high-income taxpayers is higher under our current progressive rate
structure.
14
11 See infra part II.C.3. In fact, this research indicates that the effect of the tax
subsidy on such a taxpayer would actually induce her to increase her donation by more
than $18, even though this would increase her net cost above the $100 she was
originally willing to give. See infra part II.C.3. Thus, contributions to charity are
increased by an amount greater than the decrease in taxes resulting from the
deduction. See infra part II.C.3; see also Martin Feldstein, A Contribution to the Theoiy
of Tax Expenditures: The Case of Charitable Giving, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION
99, 104-06 (HenryJ. Aaron & MichaelJ. Boskin eds., 1980).
12 This fact can be gleaned from the Code by virtue of I.R.C. § 63(b). Section
63(b) defines the taxable income of an individual who does not itemize deductions
as adjusted gross income ("AGI") less the standard deduction and the personal
exemption of I.R.C. § 151. See I.R.C. §§ 63(b), 151 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). AGI
"represents gross income less business expenses, expenses attributable to the
production of rent or royalty income, the allowed capital loss deduction and certain
personal expenses." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 43; see also I.R.C. § 62 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991). A standard deduction is "a minimum amount allowed to individual
taxpayers as a deduction from [AGI] in arriving at taxable income" and a personal
exemption is "an amount allowed as a deduction from [AGI] in arriving at taxable
income." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 572, 1404; see also I.R.C. §§ 63, 151. By defining
taxable income in this manner, the Code implicitly does not permit nonitemizers a
deduction for charitable contributions.
13 In 1988, for example, the median income of nonitemizers was $11,632, while
the median income of itemizers was $42,913. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 1988, at 34 (1989). Of the roughly 78 million
taxpayers who did not itemize, 80% had AGI below $25,000. See id. at 2, 21.
4 A progressive tax structure imposes a higher marginal tax rate as a taxpayer's
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Under the present system a low-income taxpayer who does not
itemize deductions and contributes $100 to a qualified charity will
bear the full cost of her donation, since she will pay the same total
federal income tax whether or not she contributes the $100. In
contrast, a high-income taxpayer who itemizes deductions and faces
the highest marginal tax rate of 31% is entitled to deduct the $100
contribution in calculating her taxable income, decreasing her tax
liability by $31. The government subsidizes 31% of the high-income
taxpayer's contribution but none of the low-income taxpayer's
contribution. This effect magnifies the disparity between the
government's subsidy of the two taxpayers' chosen charities. The
higher-income taxpayer is now willing to donate more than $100
because the contribution "costs less," thereby giving the charitable
organization an even greater subsidy. Meanwhile, the low-income
taxpayer's chosen charity receives no subsidy for her contribution.
As this example illustrates, the current system is really an
inequitable "upside-down subsidy." 15  The ultimate result of
channeling government funds to charitable organizations through
the mechanism of an itemized deduction is that predominantly high-
income taxpayers decide which charitable organizations are entitled
to the $17 billion of federal money expended.16  Low-income
taxpayers are denied a voice in this decision. The present tax
system provides no subsidy to the charities of the more than twenty-
two million households that do not earn enough to file a tax
return,1 7 nor does it subsidize the contributions of the seventy-
eight million households (71% of all federal taxpayers) who file
returns but do not itemize deductions.1 8 Furthermore, the current
income increases. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 12 (2d ed.
1988). In 1992, a single taxpayer paid a 15% tax on her first $21,450 of taxable
income, 28% on the next $30,450, and 31% on taxable income in excess of $51,900.
See I.R.C. § 1(c), (f) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
15 See THE DONEE GROUP, PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY: VITAL AND INNOVATIVE OR
PASSIVE AND IRRELEVANT 72 (1977) (describing the upside-down subsidy as the "great
inequity of the present system"); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARv. L. REV. 705, 720-25 (1970) (stating that tax incentives are inequitable because
they are worth more to the high-income taxpayer than to the low-income taxpayer).
16 See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
17 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
452 (1991) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (noting that there were approximately
91 million households in the nation, of which 68,770,000 paid federal income taxes).
18 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 13, at 2 (stating that 110 million
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disparity will grow worse in the coming years. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 199319 has increased the progressivity of the
income tax by raising the marginal tax rate imposed on the nation's
highest-income taxpayers, 20 thereby also increasing the already
disproportionate subsidizing of charities favored by such taxpayers.
In order to solve this existing and potentially increasing
inequity, this Comment proposes that the current itemized
deduction for charitable contributions be replaced by a refundable
tax credit21 available to all Americans, that is, itemizers, nonitem-
izers, and nonfilers alike. Returning to our example, if an upper-
and lower-income taxpayer each donate $100, they both will receive
a $20 reduction in their tax liability, despite the difference in their
marginal tax rates. Moreover, the refundability of the tax credit
permits the person with no tax liability to provide a government
subsidy to the charity of her choice by making a donation. 22 A
credit thus democratizes the choice of how the government allocates
the $17 billion of federal subsidies to charity.
23
taxpayers filed returns but only 32 million itemized deductions in 1988).
'9 Pub. L. No. 103-66 (Aug. 10, 1993) (to be codified at scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
20 See id. §§ 13201, 13202 (raising the highest marginal tax rate to 36% for single
taxpayers with taxable income exceeding $115,000 ($140,000 for married taxpayers
filing joint returns) and establishing a "high income" surtax on individuals with
taxable income in excess of $250,000, raising the effective marginal rate for such
taxpayers to 39.6%).
21 For the sake of example, this Comment will assume a 20% credit. The 20%
figure is a rough estimate of the level of credit needed to maintain the current
revenue cost and total level of charitable giving. See infra note 127.
22 A deduction has no value to an individual with no tax liability. A refundable
credit, by contrast, entitles an individual to receive a cash payment from the Treasury
in the amount that the credit exceeds his tax liability. The current earned income tax
credit to low-income individuals who maintain households for their minor children
is an example of a refundable tax credit. See I.R.C. § 32 (Supp. III 1991).
23 Some critics may argue that even an equal credit provided for the donations of
both low- and high-income taxpayers will still result in the government disproportion-
ately subsidizing the philanthropic decisions of high-income taxpayers, because the
total amount of an individual's contributions and the corresponding subsidy to the
charitable organization will increase with income. See PeterJ. Wiedenbeck, Charitable
Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REv. 85, 96 n.41 (1985) (citing studies
which indicate a positive income elasticity for charitable giving). For example, under
a credit system of 20% if an individual earning $100,000 donates $1000, and an
individual earning $10,000 donates $100, the higher-income taxpayer will designate
a subsidy of $200, 10 times that of the lower-income taxpayer's $20, though they both
receive an equal 20% subsidy in percentage terms. The fact that the amount of an
individual's donation increases with income exacerbates the inequity of the current
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If we accept former President Bush's oft-quoted analogy that the
private philanthropy of our nation's individuals is akin to "a
thousand points of light,"24 current government policy can be
viewed as disproportionately supporting the points of light of our
nation's wealthiest. If the philanthropic light of individuals across
income levels is viewed as a spectrum, the current system fails to
provide support for the light provided by the low-income portion of
the spectrum. A change to a refundable tax credit will grant equal
support for the philanthropic light of all Americans regardless of
income, and encourage an entire spectrum of charitable giving.
Part I of this Comment presents an overview of the historical
development of the tax treatment of charitable contributions. Part
II examines the alternative theoretical and policy rationales
underlying the income tax treatment of contributions by individu-
als to charitable organizations. Part III provides an example of the
current system and critiques its plutocratic nature. In Part IV, this
Comment proceeds to examine alternatives to the current system,
considering a system of direct matching grants, a deduction for
nonitemizers as set forth in a bill currently before Congress, 25 and
finally, the most desirable alternative, proposing a revenue-neutral
change to a refundable tax credit.
system. This problem could be resolved by decreasing the credit as income rises. In
our preceding example, the inequity could be eliminated by entitling the lower-
income taxpayer to a credit of 20% and the higher-income taxpayer a credit of 2%.
This Comment chooses not to advocate a credit that decreases as income rises.
Arguably, a large part of the inequity of the current system arises from a framework
that treats the individual contribution decisions of taxpayers differently depending on
one's income. The current system does not provide equal treatment for all
individuals under the law. A flat credit would equally subsidize the individual
philanthropic decision of each taxpayer irrespective of income.
24 See The Inauguration of George Bush, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1989, at 20.
25 See H.R. 152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (stating its purpose as "to restore and
make permanent" I.R.C. § 170(i) allowing a "deduction for charitable contributions
by nonitemizers"). The presence of this bill is a hopeful sign of reform since
congressional attention has been drawn to the issue. Senator Moynihan's rise to
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee also increases the possibility of a reform
of the tax funding of charitable organizations. See Rick Wartzman, Charities Cheer,
WALL ST.J., Dec. 16, 1992, at Al (describingMoynihan as the "best friend charity has
ever seen" and as an individual who "once championed letting nonitemizers make
charitable deductions").
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF
INDIVDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS
The tax preference granted individual contributions to charita-
ble organizations has a long history in the federal income tax
law. 26 The introduction of the standard deduction in 194427 and
its expansion in 1986, however, effectively eliminated the subsidy to
charitable organizations for a majority of taxpayers, removing the
opportunity for many middle- and low-income taxpayers to deduct
their contributions. 28 The adverse effect of the standard deduc-
26 Individuals were first permitted a deduction for charitable contributions in
1917, four years after the enactment of the individual income tax. See CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 11 (1985); see also War
Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1919). The income tax of
1917, which was levied almost exclusively on the wealthiest citizens, created concern
regarding the availability of income for philanthropy. See CLOTFELTER, supra, at 31.
Senator Hollis, the sponsor of the amendment which created the deduction for
contributions, stated in the Congressional Record of 1917: "[if] we impose these very
heavy taxes on incomes.., that will be the first place where these very wealthy men
will be tempted to economize, namely, in donations to charity." Id. The majority of
subsequent refinements to the law took place in 1969. See Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 101, 121, 201, 83 Stat. 487, 492-565, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 509,
513, 568, 584 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 170, 501-526 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)).
27 Added during World War II, a time of increased income tax coverage of the
citizenry, the standard deduction was advocated as a means of simplifying compliance
for the multitude of lower-income taxpayers added to the tax rolls. See CLOTFELTER,
supra note 26, at 25, 32 (explaining that the standard deduction was added in hope
that it would "achieve high compliance with a minimum of administration").
28 Whether or not the inability of low- and middle-income taxpayers to deduct
charitable contributions should be viewed as inequitable depends upon the rationale
behind the standard deduction. If the rationale behind the charitable contribution
deduction is not income measurement, see infra part II.A., then the standard
deduction could be viewed as a substitute for only those expenses which are
deductible because the government wishes to accurately measure taxable income, and
not for those which are deductible because the government wishes to encourage a
particular activity, such as charitable giving. See infra part II.B.
In addition, if the standard deduction is considered a substitute for a taxpayer's
itemized deduction, then the disallowance of a deduction to nonitemizers isjustified
on the grounds that their deduction for charitable contributions is included within
the standard deduction. If, however, the purpose of the standard deduction is to
remove lower-income taxpayers from the tax rolls, as was a "heralded" consequence
of the 1986 Act, then the disallowance of a tax preference for nonitemizers cannot
be justified. See GRAETz, supra note 14, at 508. For instance, in 1992 the standard
deduction was $3600 for a single person. If a taxpayer had $300 of charitable
contribution deductions, and $1000 of other qualified itemized deductions, the
standard deduction would provide a $2300 benefit in the form of an additional
deduction ifviewed as a substitute for an insufficient amount ofitemized deductions.
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tion on charitable giving did not go unnoticed.
The proposal brought on a storm of opposition on the basis that
the incentive effect of the charitable deduction would be lost.
Representative Carl Curtis stated, "[t]his bill, when carried into
effect, means that the individual who gives a portion of his hard-
earned money in contributions will have the same amount of taxes
withheld from his wages as if he had given nothing."
29
Nevertheless, the desire for simplification triumphed over concerns
regarding the demise of the incentive effect.8 0 Also in the name
of simplification, the Tax Reform Act of 19861 ("1986 Act")
further decreased the number of itemizers, and thus, the number of
taxpayers capable of indirectly creating subsidies for charities by
taking the charitable contribution deduction.3
2
Even before the 1986 Act, to counteract the erosion of the
subsidy, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198133 included a
provision which phased in a deduction for nonitemizers3
4
Although this provision expired in 1986,3s there is currently a bill
before Congress which proposes to re-establish such a deduction.
6
If the standard deduction of $3600 is viewed, when combined with the personal
exemption of $2300, as a mechanism to eliminate individual taxpayers with less than
$5900 of income from the tax rolls, then the disproportionate treatment of
nonitemizers' contributions is not justified.
29 CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 32.
So See id.
31 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).32 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 13, at 2 (stating that the number of
taxpayers who itemized deductions decreased by 20% from 1985 to 1988); GRAETZ,
supra note 14, at 508 (noting that the 1986 Act was designed to decrease the number
of itemizers through the increase in the amount of the standard deduction, the
disallowance of consumer interest deductions, and the imposition of a 2% adjusted
gross income floor on miscellaneous deductions).
33 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. (95 Stat.) 172 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
"4 Section 121(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 modifies I.R.C. § 170
by granting nonitemizers a deduction of 25% of the first $100 of donations in 1982
and 1983, 25% of the first $300 in 1984, 50% without limit in 1986, and full
deductibility in 1986. See id. (§ 121(a) codified at I.R.C. § 170 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)).
3' The provision was set to expire on December 31, 1986, and was not renewed.
It was officially repealed in 1990. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11801(a)(11), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1388, 1388-520.
36 See infra part IV.B.
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II. THE ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES BEHIND THE TAX TREATMENT
OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Andrews's Income Measurement Approach
The deduction for contributions to charitable organizations is
predicated on two alternative rationales. One justification is that it
is necessary to accurately measure an individual's income, since the
portion donated to charity is not available for personal consumption
or savings. 37 Defining income as the amount of a person's con-
sumption plus the change in her wealth,38 Andrews asserts that
gifts to charity should not be considered consumption. He argues
that if the income tax is viewed as a mechanism to "divert economic
resources away from personal consumption and accumulation" to
public use,3 9 then only the consumption of resources which divert
"economic resources away from other people [should be considered
consumption] in assessing income taxes." 40  Since charitable
donations do not divert resources to private use, but rather to
public use (to the extent that charitable organizations provide public
goods), 41 Andrews argues that donations should not be viewed as
37 See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 309, 312 (1972).
38 This widely-accepted definition of income is attributed to Robert Haig and
Henry Simons. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938)
("Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question."); Robert
M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921) ("Income is the money value of the net accretion to
one's economic power between two points of time.").
-9 Andrews, supra note 37, at 325.
40 Id. at 356.
41 Public goods are those commodities or services that, when purchased, provide
benefits to nonpurchasers. Such goods are characterized by "nonrival consumption"
(consumption by one person does not reduce the benefit available to others) and
"nonexclusion" (an inability to practically exclude the external benefits). See ROYJ.
RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 452-53 (3d ed. 1988).
The unique nature of public goods creates the "free-rider problem," which causes
the market to undersupply such goods. "A free rider is anyone who enjoys the
benefits of a good or service without paying the cost." Id. at 454. The market is
unwilling to supply goods on which individuals can "free ride." The government, on
the other hand, is able to provide such goods because it can compel payment for their
costs by employing its taxing power.
Education, for instance, is often thought of as a good that results in benefits to
nonpurchasers. Because the benefit of an educated populace can be enjoyed even by
those who do not pay the costs of education, society's demand for education is not
fully reflected in its market price. Only through government intervention is the full
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consumption, and thus charitable donations are properly deducted
in the Haig-Simons calculation of taxable income.
42
B. The Deduction as a Tax Subsidy
An alternative and, this Comment will argue, superior view of
the tax preference for charitable donations is that the favorable
treatment of individual donations exists to provide a subsidy to
charitable organizations because these organizations furnish public
goods. The tax subsidy is an alternative to direct government
provision of such goods.
Andrews's view that a deduction is necessary for the accurate
measurement of taxable income has been appropriately criticized as
merely "repackag[ing] the arguments for subsidizing charities,"
43
or "flip[ping] the argument for subsidizing charities on its head."
44
Andrews presupposes that charitable organizations are deserving of
public support, since they provide public goods. He then incorpo-
demand for education reflected in the price and the proper amount of education
provided. Similarly, it has been argued that the government should subsidize the war
on poverty, because a reduction in the higher crime rate and animosity associated
with divergent wealth allocation is a public good unlikely to be adequately provided
by the private market. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 465 (4th
ed. 1992) (arguing that "there are free-rider problems" that support "an argument for
forcing people to contribute to the alleviation of poverty so that they cannot take a
free ride on private donations to charity").
Services provided by charitable organizations are in the nature of public goods.
See Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 94. Wiedenbeck gives the examples of the services
provided by hospitals, museums, and colleges. He argues that there would be
inadequate consumption of such services if they were available only to those who
could afford to pay a price reflecting the full price. See id. Thus, government
support is "based on a social policy decision that such cultural and educational
opportunities should be available" to more people than "free market pricing would
permit." Id. Charities which provide services to the poor are also providing a public
good. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra, at 457 (arguing that "[t]he welfare of those with
strong altruistic feelings towards the poor will be improved by a redistribution of
income in favor of the poor" and that private insurance cannot solve the problem of
poverty since the market does not provide "'poverty' insurance, even though random
events such as bad health, technological progress, accidents, and changes in taste can
cause poverty"). For example, the Salvation Army provides food and shelter to the
downtrodden, providing a social good by, among other things, alleviating some of the
costs poverty imposes on society.
42 See Andrews, supra note 37, at 356.
43 Mark P. Gergen, The Casefora Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1416 (1988).
44 Id. at 1421.
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rates this presumption into his definition of income, excluding from
income those expenses he deems worthy of a subsidy.
45
The alternative view simply makes explicit what is implicit in
Andrews's view. Charitable giving is viewed as an item of "discre-
tionary spending that warrants an incentive."46 The tax deduction
for charitable contributions merely encourages people to "do
voluntarily what we would otherwise have to coerce them to do (i.e.,
fund collective goods)." 47 This conception of the deduction as a
subsidy of charitable giving is consistent with the view among some
economists that charity is a form of personal consumption.
48 If
charitable giving is considered as a form of personal consumption,
then it is properly included in income, 49 with a deduction viewed
as providing a subsidy for this preferable form of consumption.
The importance of this distinction is as follows: if the deduction
is necessary for the proper measurement of income, as Andrews
suggests, then a credit or any other alternative subsidy mechanism
is inappropriate because the lack of a deduction overstates taxable
income. If, on the other hand, the deduction exists simply to
subsidize charitable organizations and not to measure income, then
the "form of [the] tax subsidy is not determined a priori, but rather
is a question subject to normative policy analysis." 50 Thus, be-
cause the deduction is properly conceptualized as a tax subsidy, we
are free to consider policy considerations when deciding which
mechanism should be used to provide the subsidy.
C. Direct Budget Outlays or Indirect Subsidy?
If the current deduction for charitable donations is seen as a
means of subsidizing the provision of public goods by charitable
organizations, is it preferable for government to support the
provision of such goods through direct budget outlays to particular
45 See id.
46 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 280.
47 Gergen, supra note 43, at 1421.
48 CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 280 n.3 (recognizing that the view of charity as
a form of consumption is "'conformable to the proclivities of many economists'"
(quoting Richard E. Wagner, Death, Taxes, and Charitable Bequests: A Survey of Issues
and Options, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS 2337,2342 (Commission on Private Philanthropy
and Pub. Needs, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury ed., 1977))); see also infra notes 94-98 and
accompanying text.
49 For the Haig-Simons definition of income, which includes consumption within
the definition, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
'0 CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 280.
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charitable organizations or via a subsidy of the charitable giving of
individuals through the current tax expenditure mechanism? The
following considerations indicate that indirect support of the
charitable contributions of individuals is more desirable than direct
government support of charitable organizations.
1. Cultural Pluralism
The first argument in support of a tax subsidy approach is that
it encourages, unlike direct government expenditure, cultural
pluralism.5 1 The recipients of direct government expenditures are
chosen through a majoritarian process, "which may lead to a tyranny
of the majority. For example, if the voting population likes public
TV but doesn't like fine art or music, government-only support
through the tax and appropriation process would result in a
uniform, perhaps stifling, set of cultural and educational opportuni-
ties."52 In contrast, support of art, music, religion, education, and
other social services via a tax subsidy allocates budgetary priorities
through a system which funds the individual choices of the
populace. "The deduction encourages pluralism by permitting an
assortment of social services; taxpayers are allowed in part to vote
with their dollars, rather than by the one-person, one-vote system
that establishes ... budget priorities.
" 53
Many of the "meritorious social programs" currently provided
for by the tax expenditure for charitable giving "as a political
matter, could not be transplanted from the tax to the spending side
of the federal budget."54 The recent controversy over the direct
public funding of controversial artistic works through the National
Endowment for the Arts is a prime example of the problems caused
by majoritarian control of public funding for charitable endeav-
ors.55 Under an indirect system of support, those individuals who
want to fund charitable organizations that support controversial
artistic works have the ability to allocate federal funds for that
purpose through an indirect tax expenditure, ensuring a rich
51 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 97 ("[T]he charitable contribution deduction
fosters the coexistence of nonmajoritarian values-it encourages experimentation by
the private sector in new solutions to our social problems.").
2 Id. at 96.
13 Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
' Id. at 96 n.42 (emphasis omitted).
55 See Patti Hartigan, Senate Rejects Helms' New NEA Restrictions, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 1, 1991, at 25 (describing the "arduous two-month debate in Congress over
[direct budgetary] allocations for the National Endowment for the Arts").
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diversity of cultural endeavors not possible when funding decisions
must be made by majoritarian choice. As Posner argues, the
support of charities through a tax expenditure is "politically
important because it transfers from the government to the individu-
al taxpayer some of the power to decide who shall be recipients of
altruistic transfers, a decision that in most societies is made at the
political level."56 Support of charitable organizations through a
system of indirect support allows the donor to exercise "a form of
self-government.., that parallels, complements and enriches the
democratic electoral process itself" by "saying with his or her dollars
what needs should be met, what objectives pursued, what values
served."57
2. Constitutionality
The second argument in favor of an indirect subsidy is that it
allows for the support of religiously affiliated charitable institutions
for which direct government support is unconstitutional.58  The
Supreme Court held in Walz v. Tax Commission59 that a subsidy
provided to religious organizations through a tax expenditure does
"6 POSNER, supra note 41, at 496. The problem with the current system, however,
is that this power is vested only in those high-income taxpayers who itemize. See supra
notes 12-20 and accompanying text; infra part III.B.
57 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA 123
(1975) [hereinafter GIVING IN AMERICA]. This system of budgetary allocation ensures
government support of charitable endeavors while alleviating libertarian concern over
the liberty infringements inherent in majoritarian social planning. See generally
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (warning against such
infringements). A broad array of social services could in theory be provided by
charitable organizations supported by this pluralistic funding mechanism without the
loss of individual freedom associated with majoritarian government control. Critics,
however, lament this lack of majoritarian control. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra
note 1, at 362 ("[It is argued that some of the functions now supported by charity
should be the responsibility of the state and that allocations made from public funds
... should be subject to public discretion and scrutiny.").
58 Direct government support of religious organizations is constitutionally
prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.... ."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (suggesting that a direct money subsidy to religious organiza-
tions "would be a relationship pregnant with involvement" that would violate the
Establishment Clause).
The importance of the constitutionality of the deduction for religious
contributions might be heightened under a tax credit system. A credit would increase
the subsidy produced by low-income taxpayers, who disproportionately support
reliious organizations. See infra part III.B.
9 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (considering the constitutionality of the property tax
exemption granted to churches).
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not violate the Establishment Clause because it does not involve
excessive government entanglement with religion.6 ° This is the
correct result if the harm in government support of religion
embodied in the Establishment Clause is the coercive effect of
government involvement in matters regarding individual religious
freedom. Unlike direct budget outlays, a system of subsidizing
individual philanthropic choices does not create concerns of
government coercion because a tax subsidy involves little or no
government control over the subsidy. In Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 61 the Court stated that the Establishment Clause
"does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion
... and the Establishment Clause has never been so interpret-
ed."62 Rather, the clause "aims at preventing the relevant govern-
mental decisionmaker ... from abandoning neutrality and acting
with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious
matters."63 A subsidy that is allocated based on the individual
decisions of each citizen clearly does not involve government
advocacy of a particular religious point of view and should thus
satisfy the Amos test.
64
In addition, perhaps government should go further than merely
refraining from improperly favoring one religion over another and
6o See id. at 675 ("[T]he questions are whether [government] involvement is
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing
surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement."). The decision in
Walz has been generally viewed as supporting the constitutionality of a deduction for
contributions to charitable organizations. See, e.g., Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 95
& n.40 (citing Walz as support for his statement that "benefit to an individual donor-
taxpayer through the general charitable contribution deduction does not violate the
establishment clause").
61 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
62 Id. at 335.
63 Id.
64 It does appear possible, however, for the IRS to violate the Establishment
Clause when it decides which charitable contributions are deductible. In Hernandez
v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989),Justices O'Connor and Scalia argued in dissent
that the disallowance of a deduction by the IRS for payments made to the Church of
Scientology for auditing and training services constituted a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 713 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[T]he IRS has misapplied its longstanding practice of allowing charitable
contributions under section 170 in a way that violates the Establishment
Clause. It has unconstitutionally refused to allow payments for the religious
service of auditing to be deducted as charitable contributions in the same
way it has allowed fixed payments to other religions to be deducted.
Id. Efforts to relitigate the Hernandez holding are under way. See Powell v. United
States, 945 F.2d 374 (11th Cir. 1991) (remanding to the district court).
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view "religious tolerance [not as] a negative principle [but as] a
positive commitment that encourages the flourishing of conscience"
... and to "consider whether a nation committed to religious
pluralism must, in the age of the affirmative state, make active
provision for maximum diversity."65 The charitable contribution
deduction is such a provision, encouraging religious pluralism by
subsidizing the myriad of individual decisions to contribute to
diverse qualified religious organizations.
Finally, in addition to the value of diversity in its own right, it
can be argued that religiously affiliated organizations deserve
government support because they provide public goods.66 Because
it is based on the decisions of individuals, a tax subsidy allows the
government to provide these types of public benefits while still
ensuring individual religious freedom, including the freedom to
contribute to organizations adverse to religion.
67
3. Efficiency
A third reason justifying a tax subsidy is that it is efficient with
respect to the amount of government cost required to fund
charitable organizations. Empirical studies seem to indicate that the
institution of a charitable contribution deduction induces an
increase in the dollar amount of contributions to charity that is
greater than the decrease in the dollar amount of tax revenues
resulting from the deduction. In other words, most empirical
studies indicate that the price elasticity6 8 of charitable giving is
65 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUIoNAL LAW 1204 (2d ed. 1988).
66 Religion is generally seen as providing a beneficial community conscience,
thereby enhancing the ability of individuals to peacefully coexist. See EDITH L. FIsCH
ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 246 nn.10-13 (enumerating the
benefits of religion to society). Religious organizations also provide needed
community services. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)
("[Churches provide] social welfare services or 'good works,'.., family counselling,
aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to children."); id. at 708 ("Churches perform
some functions that a State would.., perform. I refer to nonsectarian social welfare
operations such as the care of orphaned children and the destitute and people who
are sick."); Gergen, supra note 43, at 1435 n.144 ("[O]ver half the [nation's religious]
congregations provide some form of social service (e.g. day care, counseling, food or
shelter)....").
67 For instance, an individual can currently receive a tax deduction for contribu-
tions to either the American Atheists, Inc. or Atheists United. See 1 INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., supra note 5, at 51, 117.
6The price elasticity of demand is defined as the absolute value of a "percentage
change in the quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in price." RUFFIN
& GREGORY, supra note 41, at G-9. It is the increase in consumption resulting from
1993] 2385
2386 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141: 2371
greater than one.69 Thus, the cost to the government of indirect
support of charitable organizations is less expensive than direct
support.
70
Consider the following example: a taxpayer absent government
support7l is willing to donate $1000 to charitable organizations.
The government wants to support those charitable organizations in
some manner, either directly or indirectly, and is willing to spend
$300. Under a system of direct support, the cost to the government
is simply the amount of its cash outlay to the organizations-$300.
The charitable organization will receive $1300: $1000 from the
taxpayer and $300 directly from the government.
If instead the government chooses to support the charitable
organizations indirectly, through a tax credit of 20% for example,
then its cost equals the resulting decrease in tax revenues. Under
this indirect system, the taxpayer is induced to donate more to
charity since the government is subsidizing a portion of the cost, in
effect lowering the price of donating to charity. The resulting
increase in the amount of her giving, however, will be larger than
the tax subsidy she receives from the government, if we assume that
the price elasticity is greater than one. If the price elasticity of
charitable giving is one, the taxpayer increases her pre-tax giving to
$1250.72 Since the price elasticity is greater than one,73 however,
a decrease in price. Consider, for example, a 20% decrease in the price of movies.
If the decrease in the price induces you to attend 20% more movies, then your price
elasticity for movies is 1. If you instead choose to attend 30% more movies, then
your price elasticity is 1.5, an amount greater than 1.
In the case of charitable giving, the "price" is the net cost of the donation after
tax treatment. If this amount is reduced 20% through the allowance of a credit or
a deduction, and the price elasticity is greater than 1, we would expect the amount
of charitable giving to increase by an amount greater than 20%.
69 See Feldstein, supra note 11, at 122 (determining that the deduction encourages
donors to give more than the amount of their tax savings); see also POSNER, supra note
41, at 469 ("The charitable deduction [is]... more efficient than direct government
charitable giving in inducing charitable expenditures. If as some empirical studies
have found the price elasticity of charitable giving is greater than one.., then the
charitable deduction costs the Treasury less in lost revenue than charities gain in
contributions."); Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 95 & n.41 ("[D]eductibility increases
gifts to charity by more than it decreases tax collections.").
70 In addition, as part of the private sector, charitable organizations can perhaps
provide public services more efficiently than the government. Any gains from the
more efficient provision of services by private charitable organizations is in addition
to the efficiency advantages of the tax expenditure for charitable giving outlined in
this section.
71 A tax deduction, tax credit, or matching grant are all forms of government
support.12 One thousand two hundred fifty dollars is the amount at which the net cost of
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the taxpayer will increase her giving to an amount greater than
$1250, perhaps $1500. 74 Thus, under a system of indirect support
the charitable organizations will receive $1500, an increase of $200
over the direct system of support, while the cost to the government
will remain at $300 ($1500 multiplied by the 20% credit). The
credit, which reduces the cost of donating to charity, induces the
taxpayer to make a net donation of $1200 ($1500 donation less the
$300 credit)-$200 more than she otherwise would give. Multiplied
by hundreds of thousands of taxpayers, the increase in aggregate
charitable contributions becomes quite significant.
III. THE CURRENT INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
A. An Example
Consider a $100 donation by three different taxpayers under the
current system. Taxpayer I is a single taxpayer who works part-time
at an urban convenience store. He had an AG175 of $5500 in
1992. Under 1992's. tax code, he had zero taxable income. 76 He
also donated $100 to his church in 1992, roughly two dollars a week.
He had to bear the full cost of his donation and received no govern-
her donation remains at $1000. A $1250 contribution multiplied by a 20% tax credit
equals a $250 reduction in tax liability. One thousand two hundred fifty dollars less
the $250 reduction in her tax liability resulting from the credit equals her $1000 net
cost of donation.
73 For an explanation of price elasticity, see supra note 68.
74 For this illustration, a price elasticity of 2.5 has been utilized: a 50% increase
in giving from $1000 to $1500 over the 20% reduction in price (50% divided by 20%
equals 2.5). The remainder of this Comment uses a price elasticity of approximately
1.33-a more realistic assumption. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 95 n.41 (citing
numerous studies in this range). Note that the indirect outlay still proves more
efficient even with a smaller price elasticity of 1.5. In this case, the taxpayer increases
her giving by 30% to $1300 (30% increase in giving divided by a 20% decrease in
price equals a price elasticity of 1.5). The charitable organization receives the same
$1300 it receives under the direct outlay system, but the cost to the government is
only $260 ($1300 contribution multiplied by a 20% tax credit equals a $260 reduction
in tax revenue), rather than $300. It should be noted as well that the elasticity
calculations in this Comment do not employ, for simplicity sake, the midpoints
formula or some other mechanism to avoid the distortion associated with percentage
changes in opposite directions. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 41, at 95
(describing the midpoints formula).
75 For a definition of AGI, see supra note 12.
76 His 1992 AGI is less than $5900-the sum of his standard deduction of $3600
plus his $2300 personal exemption. See supra note 12, for the definitions of standard
deduction and personal exemption.
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ment reimbursement because a person with no tax liability is not
eligible for any tax deductions.
Taxpayer II is single and is a nurse's aide in an urban hospital.
She had an AGI of $20,000, and did not itemize. Her taxable
income was $14,100. 77 She donated $100 to the homeless shelter
she passes on her way to work in the mornings. Like Taxpayer I,
she had to bear the full cost of her donation and received no
government subsidy by way of a tax deduction. In her case, this
occurred because she did not itemize her deductions, rather than as
a result of her having no tax liability.
Taxpayer III is a single taxpayer who is a machinist in a factory.
He had AGI of $32,000 in 1992, taxable income of roughly
$2 1,000,78 and a marginal tax rate of 15%.79  His donation of
$100 went to the Salvation Army, which years earlier had helped
him overcome his problem with alcohol abuse, enabling him to get
back his job at the factory. This donation entitled him to increase
his itemized deductions by $100, decreasing his taxable income by
$100 and reducing his tax liability by $15. The available subsidy,
however, induced him to increase the amount of his donation to
$141.80 The government then subsidized his contribution through
a reduction in his tax liability of $21.81 Thus, Taxpayer III not
only received a government subsidy for his charitable contribution,
unlike Taxpayers I and II, but the government also induced a $41
increase in the funding of his chosen charity, the Salvation Army.
This increase cost the government only $21.82
Taxpayer IV is a single taxpayer who practices environmental
law as an associate in a large urban law firm. She had an AGI of
$100,000. She had taxable income of approximately $80,00083 and
77 Her taxable income equals her $20,000 AGI minus $5900 (her standard
deduction of $3600 and her $2300 personal exemption).
78 This figure is based on his income of $32,000 minus the $2300 personal
exemption and approximately $8700 in itemized deductions, a reasonable estimate
for deductions of a taxpayer at this income level. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE,
1993 U.S. MASTER TAx GUIDE 76 (76th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MASTER TAX GUIDE]
(providing estimates drawn from IRS statistics of itemized deductions for taxpayers
with different AGIs).
79 See I.R.C. § 1(c), (f) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
80 With a price elasticity of 1.33, a 15% deduction will induce him to raise the
amount of his giving by 20% to $120 from $100 (20% increase in contribution divided
by a 15% decrease in the cost of the contribution equals a price elasticity of 1.33).
81 A donation of $141 multiplied by a 15% deduction equals a $21 decrease in tax
liability.
82 Recall the efficiency of the deduction discussed supra part II.C.3.
83 An AGI of $100,000 minus a $2300 personal exemption and $17,670 in
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donated $100 to the local public television station, which broadcasts
shows on the environment. This donation entitled her to reduce
her tax liability by $31 because she was in the 31% marginal tax
bracket.84 Because she knew she would receive this subsidy, she
raised the amount of her donation to $206,85 obtaining a deduc-
tion of $64.86 In this case, the government increased the funding
of the local public television station by $106 while incurring a cost
of $64. It subsidized the donation of Taxpayer IV, a high-income
taxpayer, by 31%,87 in contrast to 15% for Taxpayer III, and 0%
for Taxpayers I and II. Adding up the results in each example
shows that the total cost to the government was $85, which provided
$147 in subsidies to the charitable organizations favored by
Taxpayers III ($41 to the Salvation Army) and IV ($106 to the public
television station). No government money was provided to the
church or the homeless shelter favored by lower-income Taxpayers
I and II. The total aggregate level of charitable giving was $547.88
estimated itemized deductions equals approximately $80,000. See MASTER TAX GUIDE,
supra note 78, at 76 (estimating that the average itemized deduction for a taxpayer
with AGI of $100,000).
84 See I.R.C. § 1(c), (f) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
8 A price elasticity of 1.33 and a 31% deduction will induce her to raise the net
amount of her donation 42% to $142 from $100 (42% increase in contribution
divided by a 31% decrease in the cost of the contribution equals a price elasticity of
approximately 1.33). This assumes a constant price elasticity across income levels.
For a discussion of this assumption, see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
8 A $206 contribution multiplied by a 31% marginal tax rate equals a $64
reduction in tax liability and a net contribution of $142 (a $206 contribution minus
$64 of tax savings).
87 The phase out of itemized deductions for taxpayers with AGI in excess of
$105,250 in 1992 can lower the marginal benefit of a deduction for a charitable
contribution to potentially as little as 6% (20% of 31%) for high-income taxpayers
affected by the phase out. See I.R.C. § 68 (Supp. III 1991) (decreasing the amount
of itemized deductions by the smaller of 3% of the excess AGI over $105,250 or 80%
of total itemized deductions). In a typical case, however, the marginal benefit of an
additional donation for taxpayers subject to the phase out remains at 31%. For
example, consider the marginal benefit of an additional $1000 charitable contribution
by a hypothetical taxpayer with AGI of $250,000 and itemized deductions of $48,000.
See MASTER TAX GUIDE, supra note 78, at 76 (estimating that the average itemized
deduction for a taxpayer with AGI of $250,000). Before the $1000 contribution, § 68
calls for the amount of itemized deductions to be reduced by $4342-the lesser of
$38,400 (80% of $48,000) or $4342 ($250,000 minus $105,250 multiplied by 3%).
After the $1000 contribution deduction, the reduction of itemized deductions
resulting from § 68 remains at $4342-the lesser of $39,200 (80% of $49,000) or
$4342 ($250,000 minus $105,250 multiplied by 3%). Thus, the marginal benefit of
a charitable deduction for this hypothetical taxpayer would still be 31%, since the
$1000 contribution deduction would increase her itemized deductions bya full $1000,
reducing her tax liability by $310.
" The sum of the $100 donated by Taxpayers I and II, $141 by Taxpayer III, and
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B. A Plutocracy-A Critique of the Current System
As previously mentioned, one benefit of an indirect subsidy is
that it acts as a mechanism for the pluralistic allocation of budgetary
priorities.8 9 Under the current system, however, this "pluralism"
represents only the budgetary preferences of those with enough
income to enjoy the subsidy. Although the system can still be called
a form of self-government allowing individuals to say "what needs
should be met, what objectives pursued, [and] what values
served,"90 it is an extremely inequitable form of self-government
because it allocates the right to self-govern on the basis of income.
Those with low income have little or no voice in allocation decisions
and those with the highest income have the greatest input.
Thus, the current system fails to realize the potential for cultural
pluralism inherent in the provision of public goods through a tax
subsidy, and instead creates a system far worse than the political
majoritarian decisionmaking of direct government expenditures.
Rather than allocating budgetary outlays on the basis of the
individual decisions of each citizen, a possibility if the tax benefits
were available to all, it allocates the funding decision only to a very
small portion of society, those with the highest income. This
allocation of decisionmaking is inequitable. If individuals are to
have the power to decide how public money is spent, then that
power should be allocated without regard to an individual's income.
The power conferred upon high-income Americans by their
ability to allocate public funds through tax deductible charitable
contributions91 is most aptly described in the context of the
private foundation:
[W]e have to acknowledge the fact that private economic power is
being deployed, often dynastically, through the device of the
charitable foundation and the power it gives the founder and the
founder's family to select the objects of their charitable bounty
and to manage the charitable assets.
92
$206 by Taxpayer IV.
89 See supra part II.C.1
90 GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 57, at 123.
91 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 287 (examining the argument that the
measurement of "the distributional impact of the charitable deduction should go
beyond conventionally measured economic benefits to include the distribution of
economic power" because the mechanism "concentrat[es] power at upper income
levels").92 Id. at 287-88 (quotingJohn G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax
System, 5 PRoB. LAw. 1, 5, 17, 27 (1978)).
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The power vested in high-income Americans by the current tax
deduction also creates an opportunity to enjoy reciprocity for one's
philanthropy.93 One view of charity is that it is support offered
under the "consideration that help may be returned" in some less
direct form.94 Under this view, philanthropy is granted not just
for disinterested altruistic reasons, 95 but for the ability to gain a
return benefit of some type. If this is true, then taxpayers contrib-
ute to those charitable organizations which return benefits to them.
Studies substantiate this view, finding that the type of charitable
organizations supported varies by income level, with high-income
taxpayers providing their government-subsidized support primarily
to cultural institutions, and low-income taxpayers providing their
unsubsidized support to religious institutions and community
welfare agencies. 96 Not surprisingly, studies indicate that wealthy
taxpayers disproportionately benefit from services provided by the
cultural charities such as museums, public television, and sympho-
nies to which they allocate public money.97 Correspondingly, low-
income taxpayers donate to religious institutions and social-welfare
organizations because they view those organizations as more likely
to respond to their needs:
[M]utual-aid associations and churches, both characterized by aid
or assistance among members, have high components of reciprocal
giving. According to this view, philanthropy and everyday helping
9 The law properly limits one's ability to enjoy a direct benefit in return for a
contribution. See Rev. Rul. 78-232, 1978-1 C.B. 69 (stating that a deduction will be
disallowed if the donor receives a benefit in exchange for the contribution). The
reciprocity referred to here involves the much more indirect practice of taxpayers
funding those organizations whose services they enjoy. Taxpayers who fund public
television because they enjoy watching public television, or fund the symphony
because they enjoy classical music are such examples.
94 CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 37.
9' But see id. at 35 (describing charitable behavior as based "on sympathetic
feelings for others, social norms, or individual feelings of commitment" as well).96 See id. at 283; Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions:
Part Il-The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAxJ.
209, 224 (1975); Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101.9 7 See RONALD E. FRANK & MARSHALL G. GREENBERG, THE PUBLIC'S USE OF
TELEvISION 175 (1980) (finding that the viewers of public television tend to be those
individuals with high incomes); Gergen, supra note 43, at 1446 & n.186 (finding that
public television viewers tend to be high-income taxpayers and also asserting that the
income distinction is even more pronounced in the case of other cultural charities).
This Comment takes no issue with the merits of the public funding of cultural
organizations. The decision to fund such organizations, however, should be made
through a process which equally considers the views and perspectives of each citizen,
regardless of income.
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behavior are part of an informal mutual insurance pact ....
[P]eople act charitably for the same reason they buy insurance.
[T]his kind of giving brings the benefit of potential return aid
98
Lower-income American's support of their local religious
congregations and social-welfare organizations, such as the Salvation
Army, represents a form of enlightened self-interest, supporting
those organizations which are most likely to offer a helping hand
during difficult times, enjoying, like their higher-income counter-
parts, reciprocal benefits for their charitable giving. The ability to
enjoy some reciprocal services for one's charity is an inevitable and
acceptable aspect of private philanthropy. Unfortunately, the
current deduction subsidizes only the reciprocal benefits of high-
income Americans.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. A Matching Grant
One possible way to confront the inequitable allocation of power
is to replace the current system with a system of matching grants.
Under a matching-grant system, "[e]ach donor's gift would be
matched by a predetermined amount from the government, the
federal share to be transmitted directly to the charitable institution
of the donor's choice." 99 For instance, each individual contribu-
tion of $100 to a designated charity would allocate a federal
matching grant directly to that charity in the amount of 20% or
$20.100 Like a credit, such a system would have the benefit of
eliminating the inequitable distribution of the subsidy because it
would be in no way tied to income levels.
On the other hand, a matching grant would create other
problems not associated with a credit. It has the potential to
eliminate or deteriorate the benefits of cultural pluralism, raise
constitutional issues involving subsidies to religiously affiliated
98 CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 37-38.
99 Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A
Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (1972).
100 The percentage needed to maintain the current level of total giving under a
matching grant system perhaps needs to be higher than that of a credit, given the
potential loss of the efficiency provided by a tax expenditure. See supra part II.C.3;
infra part IV.A.3.
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institutions, and cause inefficiencies associated with an indirect
subsidy.
1. Cultural Pluralism
One concern about a matching grant program is the possible
effect on the benefits of the pluralistic nature of the subsidy. The
fear is that the process of deciding which charitable organizations
qualify for deductible contributions might become overly politicized.
The IRS, which now makes these decisions, has proven quite even-
handed and effective in its administration of the task. 101 While
advocates envision a system administered by the IRS (with individu-
als listing their charitable donations on a separate schedule with
their tax return and the Treasury in turn issuing checks to the
designated organizations), they acknowledge that "obviously
Congress may want to look more closely at [which organizations
qualify for matching grants]."10 2
A system where government directly funds the organization, as
opposed to inducing the individual to do so, would likely be more
susceptible to political intervention and opportunism than the
current tax deduction. Subsidizing charitable organizations through
a tax expenditure is more protective of the privacy of individual
donors and their choices of to whom to donate:
When a donor takes a tax deduction for a charitable contribu-
tion his privacy is an inextricable part of the more generally
protected privacy that is accorded to federal income tax returns.
Thus, an attempt to breach it-for example, on the theory that
deductions are equivalent to expenditures and that the public is
entitled to know who is controlling the destiny of these hypotheti-
cal public funds-would be seen as a threat to the privacy of
everyone's tax return .... 103
101 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 99 & n.49 (stating that despite numerous
proposals the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs "was not
persuaded that a viable alternate to the Internal Revenue Service exists and was, in
fact, satisfied that .... the Service has demonstrated its capacity for independent,
impartial oversight of tax-exempt organizations including determination of exempt
status"); see also Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching
Grants?, 28 TAx L. REv. 37,45 (1972) ("[T]he definition of exempt organizations by
section 501(c)(3) of the Code and the administration of this definition by the [IRS
has] been relatively free of bias.")
102 McDaniel, supra note 99, at 399.
103 Bittker, supra note 101, at 45.
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A system of matching grants, by contrast, "would not be
protected by a similar umbrella; and might well be swept away by a
revival of McCarthyism, aided perhaps by a philosophic claim
(already implicit in some proposal to substitute grants for deduc-
tions) that secrecy is incompatible with democratic values."
10 4
The administration of a matching-grant system would allow for "the
intrusion of official concepts of right and wrong . ... "105 It is
likely that a system of matching grants would be administered with
"administrative and congressional investigations, loyalty oaths,
informal or implicit warnings against heterodoxy and the other
trapping of government support that the tax deduction has, so far,
been able to escape."10 6 For a current example, recall again the
politicization of the public funding of the National Endowment for
the Arts and Senator Helms's critique of the artistic choices of some




A matching-grant system which provides matching funds to
religious organizations appears to violate the restraints of the
Establishment Clause, thus eliminating the benefits of the current
subsidy to religiously affiliated charitable organizations.108 Reex-
amine the distinction made by the court in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion ° 9 which contrasted a permissible tax expenditure and a
direct-money subsidy: "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be
a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most govern-
mental grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed
administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or
administrative standards, but that is not this case." 110 Proponents
of the matching grant acknowledge the Establishment Clause
problems raised by the Court's distinction in Walz between a direct
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 46.
107 See Hartigan, supra note 55 (quoting Sen. Helms after the Senate's rejection
of his attempt to place content restrictions on National Endowment for the Arts
grants).
108 See supra part II.C.2; see also Bittker, supra note 101, at 41-42 (arguing against
a system of matching grants because it would be forced to exclude religious
organizations under the Establishment Clause).
109 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
11o Id. at 675.
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money grant and a tax expenditure,"11 however they criticize the
distinction, pointing to the widely accepted theory that "tax
allowances are the functional equivalent of direct grants of public
funds."112 They argue therefore that because the two are "func-
tional[ly] equivalent," the Court should either "nullify[] tax
allowances to churches or validat[e] direct grants to them."
113
While a tax expenditure may provide monetary support to
religious institutions equivalent to a direct matching grant, it is
unclear how this addresses the concerns of the Court's Establish-
ment Clause analysis which focuses on the level of government
involvement. The Court's distinction is likely not the result of a
lack of "economic sophistication," 114 but instead a recognition of
the increased level of government involvement inherent in a system
that requires direct grants. If, as Bittker argues, a direct matching
system is more susceptible to political intervention and opportun-
ism,1 1 5 and allows for "the intrusion of official concepts of right
and wrong,"116 then the Court is justified in distinguishing be-
tween a tax expenditure and a direct grant. The current tax
expenditure has been able to protect against "the relevant govern-
ment decisionmaker... abandoning neutrality and acting with the
intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious mat-
ters." 117 It is unclear how a direct matching grant system could
ensure the same protection from government coercion and
withstand an Establishment Clause challenge, given the likely
increase of government involvement in a system of matching grants.
3. Efficiency
If, as empirical data seem to indicate, the price elasticity of
charitable giving is greater than one, then a tax expenditure is a
desirable form of support because it induces individuals to increase
their contributions by an amount in excess of the revenue cost to
the government.118 However, it is unclear whether a system of
matching grants would result in the same efficiency.119 If a
nl See McDaniel, supra note 99, at 409-10 & n.67.
112 Bittker, supra note 101, at 40-41; see also McDaniel, supra note 99, at 411
(arguing that the Court's distinction "will just not stand up to analysis").
11 Bittker, supra note 101, at 41.
114 McDaniel, supra note 99, at 410 n.67.
11 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
116 Bittker, supra note 101, at 45.
17 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
118 See supra part II.C.3.
119 See Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55
1993] 2395
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system of matching grants did not result in individuals increasing
their donations because of the subsidy, a system of matching grants
could result in the government incurring the same revenue cost
while decreasing the funding of charitable organizations.
B. A Deduction for Nonitemizers
OnJanuary 5, 1993, House Ways and Means Committee member
Philip M. Crane, a Republican from Illinois, introduced House Bill
152, which proposes to allow a deduction for the charitable
contributions of nonitemizers. 120 The proposal permits a deduc-
tion for the contributions of the seventy-eight million taxpayers who
currently receive no subsidy for their charitable giving, 121 going
a long way toward reducing the current inequitable distribution of
power in favor of higher-income taxpayers. In our example, the
only taxpayer affected by the change proposed in the Crane bill
would be Taxpayer II (the nurse's aide who donated $100 to the
homeless shelter). She will now be entitled to treatment identical
to Taxpayer III. She will be able to deduct her contribution, and
will be induced to donate $141 to the shelter, reducing her taxes by
$21.122 The government will incur a revenue loss of $21, and
fund the homeless shelter by $41. Taxpayer I, however, (the
convenience store worker donating $100 to his church) will still
receive no subsidy for his donation and will continue to donate
$100 since he has no taxable income. A deduction, even one
available to nonitemizers, will not benefit him. Likewise, the
allowance of a deduction for nonitemizers will not change the
treatment of Taxpayers III and IV, both of whom were already
entitled to the deduction by virtue of being itemizers. So in our
example, the effect of the proposed change in the law would be to
increase the cost to the government by $21, while correspondingly
increasing the funding of the homeless shelter by $41.
FORDHAm L. REv. 395,423 (1987) ("If the deduction for charitable contributions were
repealed and a matching-grant program were enacted in its stead,... the government
incurs a cost without an offsetting benefit in the form of increased charitable
giving.").
120 See H.R. 152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing "to restore and make
permanent the deduction for charitable contributions by nonitemizers").
121 See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining that 78 million taxpayers file
returns but do not itemize deductions).
122 The $21 reduction in tax liability is computed by multiplying her $141
contribution by the 15% deduction.
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The proposed change, while an improvement on the current
deduction, is inferior to a credit for three reasons. First, it keeps in
place the current disproportionate subsidy of high-income taxpay-
ers' contributions created by the progressive rate structure. The
Taxpayer IVs of the nation still receive a 31% subsidy, while
Taxpayers II and III continue to receive only a 15% subsidy. The
overwhelming majority of the seventy-eight million taxpayers to
whom this proposal grants a deduction are in the 15% marginal tax
bracket, 123 while the higher-income taxpayers at the 31% marginal
rate continue to receive a higher subsidy for their charitable giving.
Second, the deduction for nonitemizers allocates no subsidy to
the philanthropy of the over twenty-two million zero bracket
taxpayers124 like Taxpayer I (the convenience store employee)
who do not earn enough to take advantage of the deduction. A
deduction is of no value to a taxpayer who without the deduction
already has zero taxable income. A refundable tax credit provides
these individuals with an equal subsidy.
125
Third, unlike this Comment's revenue-neutral credit, the Crane
proposal results in a net loss of federal tax revenue, since it extends
the deduction to nonitemizers without a corresponding reduction
in the subsidy provided to itemizers. 126 Using the numbers from
our example, this proposal costs the government $21, but there is
no corresponding increase in revenue (although the homeless
shelter's funding would increase by $41 because of the efficiency of
the indirect subsidy).
125 Over 88% of nonitemizinghouseholds have, on average, taxable income of less
than $22,000. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 13, at 21, 35 (placing such
taxpayers well within the 15% marginal bracket); see also I.R.C. § 1(c), (f) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991) (delineating that the 15% bracket ends at roughly $22,000 for single
taxpayers and roughly $36,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly).
124 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 17, at 452.
125 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
126 See Wartzman, supra note 25, at Al (describing a deduction for nonitemizers
as "costly"). The Crane bill provides a subsidy to the 78 million taxpayers who do not
itemize, while leaving in place the amount of the subsidy granted to high-income
taxpayers. A 20% tax credit reduces the amount of the subsidy for high-income
taxpayers in the 31% and 28% marginal tax brackets to 20%, while increasing the
subsidy of those individuals facing a 0% and 15% marginal tax rate. The decrease in
the subsidy for higher-income taxpayers increases revenue. The Crane bill provides
no offsetting revenue increase. This Comment argues that the revenue increase in
lowering the subsidy for higher-income taxpayers will roughly equal the revenue
outlay for increasing the subsidy for lower-income taxpayers, making the proposal
revenue neutral at a particular percentage amount. See infra part IV.C.1.
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C. A Refundable Credit
1. The Proposal
This Comment proposes that the current system utilizing
deductions should be replaced with a refundable tax credit, which
provides an equal subsidy across income levels, similar to the system
of matching grants. The credit should be equal to the amount of
qualified charitable contributions times a revenue-neutral percent-
age level. For the sake of example, this Comment assumes the
percentage to be 20%.127 In our example, this means that the
treatment of each taxpayer's $100 donation is identical. Each is
entitled to a 20% tax credit for the amount of their contribution.
The decrease in the cost of giving causes each taxpayer in our
example to increase his or her donation to $159,128 and entitles
each to a tax credit of $32.129
Noted empirical studies which have examined this issue indicate
that a shift to a revenue-neutral credit would not create a change in
the total amount of charitable giving, since the price elasticity of
giving appears to be constant across income levels.13 0 If price
elasticity is constant across income levels and the level of the credit
is chosen to keep the revenue cost at the same amount as the
127 Twenty percent is a rough estimate of the level of credit necessary to maintain
the revenue cost at $17 billion. See supra note 2. The preceding studies cited
examine the effect of a 25% credit, but such studies were conducted prior to the 1986
Act's reduction in rates. See infra note 130. It seems likely that a lower credit would
currently be necessary to maintain revenue neutrality. The government should and
would study the revenue impact in determining the level of credit necessary to
maintain the current revenue cost of the tax expenditure.
128 This represents a 27% increase in the net cost of their donations from $100
to $127 ($159 donation minus the $32 credit), since each taxpayer has a price
elasticity of roughly 1.35 (27% increase in charitable contribution divided by a 20%
reduction in the price of the contribution).
12' The $32 refund is computed by multiplying the $159 charitable contribution
by the 20% tax credit.
130 See Feldstein, supra note 96, at 209-10 ("[T]he econometric evidence indicates
that the price elasticity of giving ... does not differ significantly among income
groups. .. ."); Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101 n.54 ("The data reveal that price
elasticity ... does not vary significantly through a wide range of incomes.").
Nevertheless, these studies are by no means conclusive, and substantial disagreement
does exist over the price elasticity for taxpayers at different income levels. See e.g.,
CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 66-71 (ultimately concluding that "It]he evidence
summarized here provides no firm conclusion regarding the important issue of
variation in the price elasticity by income level"). The likelihood of a small or
nonexistent difference in price elasticity seems strong enough to support changing
to a credit without significant concern about a decrease in aggregate giving.
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current deduction (that is, a revenue-neutral change) then total
aggregate giving will be unchanged.131 "[T]he substitution of a
... credit would yield approximately the same total aggregate giving
at the same revenue cost as the current deduction, even though the
credit would present the same cost of giving to all taxpayers."
13 2
In our example, this means that net cost to government-the
revenue loss-stays at $85, while maintaining the total subsidy to
charitable organizations at an amount of $147, and the total
aggregate giving at $547.133
Though a shift to a credit would not change the total aggregate
level of charitable giving, it "would have a dramatic impact on the
distribution of contributions," that is which organizations are funded,
and by whom.13 4 Every American across all income levels would
have a say in the allocation of the $17 billion government subsidy
to charitable organizations. Each American would be able to
participate in this "form of self-government" by "saying with his or
her dollars what needs should be met, what objectives pursued, what
values served." 135 In our example, this means that the treatment
of each individual is identical.13 6 Each would be entitled to a 20%
credit for the amount of their contribution. The government would
subsidize equally137 the decision of Taxpayer I to support his local
131 Because the sensitivity to the net price of giving is constant across income
levels, "the total cost in terms of foregone tax revenue is essentially independent of
the method used to stimulate contributions." Feldstein, supra note 96, at 210.
132 Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101 n.54.
133 Actually, following through in the example results in a revenue loss to the
government of $43 (a $32 credit for each of the four taxpayers of $128 less the
existing $85 revenue cost), an increase in the subsidy to charity of $236 (a $59
increase in each of the four taxpayer's donations), and an increase in total aggregate
giving to $89 (a $159 donation from each of the four taxpayers of $636 less the
existing level of $547). This revenue loss of the proposal and the increase in the
amount of charitable giving results from the decision to include within the example
a disproportionate amount of lower-income giving in order to demonstrate the effect
of different possible changes in the law on these lower-income taxpayers. Thus, the
decrease in charitable giving and corresponding tax savings for those taxpayers facing
the 28% and 31% marginal tax rates is understated in the example and the increase
in giving and corresponding revenue cost of lower-income taxpayers facing a zero and
15% marginal tax rate is overstated, causing our example to, in total, overstate the net
revenue loss and the increase in charitable giving.
13 Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101.
135 GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 57, at 123.
13' Keep in mind the caveat of supra note 23, regarding the ability of high-income
taxpayers to designate a larger subsidy through their ability to contribute larger
amounts.
137 The amount of the subsidy is $59 (the $159 donated after the credit as
compared to the $100 donated without the subsidy), at a cost to the government of
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church, the decision of Taxpayer II to fund the homeless shelter,
the decision of Taxpayer III to donate to the Salvation Army, and
the decision of Taxpayer IV to provide for public television.
2. Confronting Concern
a. Compliance and Cost
Part of the reason given for the repeal of the deduction for
nonitemizers in the 1986 Act was the cost associated with taxpayers
having to substantiate contributions and the IRS having to verify
more numerous and smaller contributions.1 18  Currently, IRS
regulations require that cash contributions be substantiated by one
of the following: (i) a "cancelled check"; (ii) a "receipt from the
donee charitable organization"; or (iii) in "the absence of [(i) or
(ii)] ... other reliable written records [produced by the taxpayer
which] "show[] the name of the donee, the date of the contribution,
and the amount of the contribution." 13 9 The reliability of the
records listed in (iii) is "determined by reference to facts and
circumstances" such as the "contemporaneous nature" of the
records and the "regularity of the taxpayer's recordkeeping
procedures." 140 In all cases, however, "the burden shall be on the
taxpayer to establish reliability."
14 1
Unquestionably, extending the subsidy for charitable contribu-
tions involves an increase in record keeping costs by taxpayers
because more of them would be concerned with substantiating their
deduction. 142 Nevertheless, the substantiation of most charitable
giving requires very little extra effort on the part of the taxpayer.
As provided in the regulation, any donation made by check provides
an instant record. To the extent that poorer taxpayers are more
likely to donate in cash, they could as easily obtain a receipt for
$32 (the cost of foregone tax revenue from each taxpayer is equal to the amount of
the credit ($159 multiplied by the 20% credit equals $32)).
138 See Ronald A. Pearlman, Repeal of Charitable Contributions for Nonitemizers
Explained, 28 TAx NOTES 1140 (1985) (arguing that the nonitemizer deduction is
"administratively burdensome" because the IRS "is forced to verify numerous small
contributions, and taxpayers must maintain records substantiating such contribu-
tions").
139 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(a)(1) (as amended in 1988).
140 Id. § 1.170A-13(a)(2)(i).
141 Id.
142 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 26, at 284 ("[T]he extension of a tax subsidy for
charitable gifts to low-income households might require significant increases in record
keeping by taxpayers.").
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each contribution or maintain a simple record of donations as
required by the regulation.
The additional cost to the IRS of verifying the donations of
lower-income taxpayers is also overstated. While the expansion of
a credit to more taxpayers will potentially involve some additional
cost, it is not clear that the use of standard verification methods will
be unable to detect fraudulently reported contributions. 143 While
compliance presents the most legitimate concern with expanding
the subsidy to lower-income taxpayers, the additional costs that
might be incurred cannot justify denying 100 million house-
holds144 a voice in deciding which charitable organizations should
receive the $17 billion of public funding.
b. Hiding the Subsidy
As discussed in connection with direct matching grants, part of
the benefit of the current system is to shield the subsidy of
charitable organizations from political manipulation by administer-
ing it through the tax system, as opposed to a system of direct
matching contributions. The tax credit has also been criticized as
being susceptible to political control. 145 Critics of the credit
claim that it would be more easily "recognized as a means of
government assistance" of charitable organizations than is a
deduction, exposing the choice of which various charitable organiza-
tions qualify for the subsidy to political intervention and opportun-
ism.146 Even assuming that a credit system would more easily be
recognized as a subsidy of charitable organizations (which is not
14S Currently, the "vast majority of IRS audits are triggered by the agency's
computers" which analyze the "interrelationship of various items on the return," by
comparing "what other people in the same income bracket have typically claimed."
Rick Wartzman, Don't Wave a Red Flag at the IRS, WALL ST.J., Feb. 24, 1993, at C1
("'We look for how things play against each other,' explains Mike Killfoil, the IRS's
acting assistant commissioner for examination."). In the case of a charitable
contribution credit, an audit trigger for donations reported in excess of a reasonable
percentage of AGI could catch many taxpayers who fraudulently reported charitable
contributions.
144 The 100 million individuals represent 22 million who are zero bracket
taxpayers, see STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 17, at 452, plus 78 million taxpayers
who do not itemize deductions, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 13, at 2.
145 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101 (citing the Commission on Philanthropy
and Public Needs as rejecting the tax credit for this reason). It is likely however that
the amount of the subsidy provided charitable organizations is more susceptible to
adjustment, since changing the level of a credit is easier than changing the benefit
provided by a deduction.
146 Wiedenbeck, supra note 23, at 101.
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entirely clear), fair, even-handed administration of the question of
which organizations qualify for the credit would be maintained,
because the IRS would continue to decide this question under a
credit system.1 47 Likewise, an individual's contribution would
continue to receive the "privacy that is accorded to federal income
tax returns," under a credit system.
148
CONCLUSION
The current tax preference granted an individual's charitable
contribution is properly viewed as a mechanism to provide govern-
ment support to charitable organizations. The provision of a public
subsidy through the tax system efficiently provides support in a
manner that ensures cultural and religious pluralism. The historical
development and expansion of the standard deduction and the
progressive tax structure, however, have created a system which
predominantly subsidizes the charities favored by high-income
taxpayers. This Comment has considered alternatives to the current
inequitable plutocratic allocation of power and proposes a refund-
able tax credit to replace the current deduction. The tax credit will
greatly reduce the inequity of the current system while maintaining
revenue cost and aggregate giving at current levels.
147 Recall our discussion of the IRS's freedom from bias in its administration of
this question. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
14' Bittker, supra note 101, at 45.
